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Abstract 
There has been much debate about how we perceive other people’s minds. Some theories, such 
as Theory of Mind, are based on the presumption that the minds of others are closed and 
inaccessible, requiring some form of inferential processing and mentalizing to understand. On 
the other hand, Direct Social Perception says that information about the mental states of others is 
readily available to perceive and requires no internal processing to understand. Taking either 
theory into account, it remains an open question if expertise plays a role in social perception. 
This study aimed to identify if experience in portraying emotions through dance would affect 
recognition of emotional body movement. A group of 21 dancers and 23 non-dancers viewed 40 
point-light displays of movement showing anger, fear, happiness, and sadness. Their accuracy 
and reaction time were recorded. It was hypothesized that dancers would have increased 
accuracy, as well as faster reaction times across emotions. A 4 × 2 ANOVA was used to analyze 
the results. Results rejected the hypothesis that dancers would have increased accuracy and 
reaction time, indicating no significant differences between the two groups. A significant main 
effect was found on the accuracy data for emotion type. Fear and happiness were the most 
accurately recognized emotions across groups. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Theories in Social Perception 
To interact with one another, humans must attribute mental states to others in their 
environment. The minds of others have traditionally been assumed to be closed and inaccessible. 
To form an understanding of others’ mental states, one must develop a Theory of Mind (TOM). 
TOM is the concept of attributing a wide range of mental states including intentions, beliefs, and 
desires to others with the goal of interpreting, explaining, and predicting their behavior (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978). The ability is sometimes referred to as “mind reading” or “mentalizing” and 
is thought to develop in early childhood. The way we attribute mental states to others is split into 
two accounts, Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). TT holds that individuals have a 
basic understanding of human behavior, a folk psychology view of other’s minds and use this to 
make inferences about mental states. Folk psychology is the idea that we have a framework of 
concepts that include knowledge of social structures, roles, or knowledge about a person’s 
history or personality that help form a basic understanding of everyday life. According to TT, this 
framework is used when mindreading (Spaulding, 2012). ST suggests that individuals base these 
attributions on their own mental states and experiences and denies the use of theories in 
understanding others. Instead, ST argues that we use our own minds to simulate the minds of 
others (Davies & Stone, 1995). Although the mechanisms through which mental states of others 
are attributed differ between TT and ST, the goal is the same. To function appropriately in social 
situations, one must mentalize the states of others to understand and formulate a response.  
The presumption that the minds of others are hidden away and require inferential 
processing is challenged by the notion of Direct Social Perception (DSP), which posits that the 
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mental states of others are directly perceivable. According to this view, information about the 
mental states of others is readily available to pick up and requires no inferential mediation 
(Gallagher, 2008; Wiltshire et al., 2015). Many mental states are perceivable by others because 
they are thought to manifest in bodily states. During social perception, viewers are provided with 
enough information about the mental state of others from bodily states that manifest during the 
social interaction. According to DSP, we see the mental state in the behavior. For example, if a 
person is crying you see that they are upset. There is no inference over what the behavior is 
telling us about the mental state, you simply see the mental state in the behavior. Those in 
support of DSP argue that mental states are perceived in the same immediacy as regular, 
everyday objects, such as a cup. When perceiving a cup, one does not infer from sense data that 
the object is a cup, one simply sees that it is a cup. Unlike other inferential theories, DSP denies 
that mental states are hidden and unobservable. 
Direct Social Perception and Affordances 
According to Gibson (1979), humans perceive to act and act to perceive. Gibson referred 
to this as the perception-action cycle. In this cycle, perception is based on opportunities for 
action, known as affordances. Affordances correspond to a relationship between the perceiver 
and the actions they can perform with objects or events in their environment. In Gibson’s (1979) 
theory of direct perception, he proposes that information about affordances is specified in the 
form of invariant patterns in optic flow. In terms of individual action, such personal affordances 
can include perceiving the graspability of an object or the passability of a doorway (Warren & 
Whang, 1987). In terms of social interactions, interpersonal affordances can include reciprocal 
social actions such as those between a buyer and seller, or between predator and prey (Gibson, 
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1979). The idea is that there is optical information about interpersonal affordances that provide 
sufficient information to guide interaction without additional inferences needed. 
Recently, Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel (2015) argued that the perception of different 
emotions is distinguished by specific characteristics and patterns, and that emotional recognition 
is simply a process of pattern recognition. They argue that there is a typical behavior for some 
emotions, and that perceiving these emotions rely on using these expressive actions as signs in 
emotion recognition. Similarly, the James Lange theory of emotion states that emotional states 
have equivalent physiological responses, and to have an emotion one must experience certain 
bodily responses. Following this theory, to perceive another person’s mental state would be a 
matter of recognizing their physiological response as a specific emotion. This idea that a person’s 
bodily state can give insight about their mental state is supported by findings from Atkinson et al. 
(2004), who found that postures and gestures gave viewers sufficient information to correctly 
identify emotions using dynamic point-light displays. Emotions are not the only candidates 
suitable for DSP. An embodied cognition approach supports the view that intentions may be 
externalized and thus directly perceivable. Intentions are conceptually connected to action, and 
because of this we can directly perceive intentions (Spaulding, 2015). 
Social Event Perception 
Different types of limb motions such as walking, dancing, and running, along with the 
speed at which these movements are done, are easily identifiable in human vision. Johansson 
(1973) has shown that these movements can also be identified using abstract light patterns called 
point-light displays. This technique involves attaching small lights to the joints of actors and 
filming their movement in the dark so that just the point-light movement is captured. This 
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technique ensures that only the kinematics are captured, and all other extra background 
information is not included in the display. Johansson (1973) found that walking movement was 
readily picked up by viewers when using these point-light displays, leading to further studies to 
test how much information can be identified using point-light displays. In a later study, 
Johansson (1976) found that viewers could differentiate between point-light displays showing 
non-biological movement by puppets and biological movement by human actors, even with 
similarities in spatial patterns. Johansson (1976) noted that the findings suggest that visual 
processing relies on approximations of movements rather than rigid mathematical procedures. 
The idea that we use these visual approximations to understand movements is supported 
and built upon in numerous other studies. Runeson and Frykholm (1981, 1983) found that 
observers were able to accurately judge the weight of a box being lifted by point-light actors, as 
well as if the actor’s intention was to deceive about the weight. This supports the principle of 
Kinematic Specification of Dynamics (KSD), which states the kinematic properties provide 
information to specify their causes. Kinematic properties are the motions, while dynamics refers 
to an explanation of the motion in terms of what causes it. The idea that kinematic patterns 
provide rich sources of information can be further supported in studies where the sex of a point-
light walker was readily identifiable (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977) as well as identity (Cutting & 
Kozlowski, 1977). Studies examining emotional perception using point-light displays found that 
observers could identify sadness, anger, and happiness from gait information alone (Montepare, 
Goldstein, & Clausen, 1987). A more recent study compared the same stimuli in both point-light 
and full-light display (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004). In this study, ten actors 
were asked to portray five emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness) at three levels 
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of exaggeration. Two sets (one in full-light with faces covered, and one in point-light) of 150 
portrayals of emotions were created, along with a corresponding static image captured at the 
peak expression of each emotional portrayal. Their findings confirmed that basic emotions are 
readily identifiable in point-light displays, as well as in full-light. It was also found that 
exaggeration of movements led to greater recognition accuracy, especially in the point-light 
condition, and that the videos produced higher emotional-intensity ratings than the static images. 
This finding suggests that emotional rating judgement relies more on movement than static 
information. 
These papers suggest that not only is it important to use dynamic stimuli as opposed to 
static, but additionally that there is valuable information in bodily movement and point-light 
displays are useful in separating this movement from background noise. Ansuini, Cavallo, 
Bertone, & Becchio (2014) summarize past research which has shown that observers are able to 
use kinematic information to make judgements about movement patterns and intentions. 
Research has shown observers ability to judge the intention of observed reach to grasp 
movement as cooperative, competitive, or individual (Becchio, Cavallo, Begliomini, Sartori, 
Feltrin, & Castiello, 2012). These findings support the conceptual views of KSD as well as the 
empirical validity of using patch-light displays to study social knowing. The findings also 
provide support for the proposition that kinematic information is perceived and used by social 
observers. 
Expertise Matters 
Perception is subject to the same influences as human behavior, and thus learning shapes 
an individual’s perception. Regardless of if social events are perceived directly or inferentially, it 
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remains an open question what role, if any, expertise plays. Previous research has highlighted the 
importance of perceptual learning and attunement to task-specific information (Bingham, 
McConnell, & Muchisky, 2001). In their work (see also McConnell, Muchisky, & Bingham, 
1997), the use of feedback in judgments about events was found to enhance the participants 
calibration to the task and allowed the participant to attune to specific features of the event 
properties of interest. Abernethy and Zawi (2007) examined expertise related differences in 
information uses between expert badminton players and non-expert badminton players using 
point-light displays. Their findings suggest that expertise plays a role in what information 
participants focused on during the experimental task.  
Bläsing, Calvo-Merino, Cross, Jola, Honisch, and Stevens (2012) suggest that dance is a 
useful resource when researching movement and cognition. This paper also identifies a point 
made in earlier researcher in saying that the origins of dance are intrinsically linked to social 
interactions (Brown, Martinez, & Parsons, 2005). Bläsing et al. (2012) summarized the multiple 
aspects of embodied cognition involved in performing and perceiving dance. Dance requires 
enhanced sensorimotor and proprioceptive skills and the ability to encode sequences of 
movement. Experienced dancers show increased expertise in kinesthetic imagery tasks based on 
their use of motor imagery in dance training (Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004). The idea of 
embodied cognition states that cognition manifests itself not only in the mind of the agent, but 
also the body (Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  This suggests that an agent’s mental state may be 
externalized to their body. Embodied cognition supports the idea of direct social perception, 
suggesting that an agent’s mental state can be directly perceived from their externalized behavior 
(Wiltshire, Lobato, McConnell, & Fiore, 2015). This idea is consistent with KSD, which 
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suggests that movement provides information about the causal factors of the movement, which in 
this case is the intention behind the action. Dance expertise requires dancers to embody 
emotions, suggesting that they will have increased expertise when perceiving emotions during 
social interaction.  This raises the question of whether dancers are better at identifying target 
emotions from kinematics based on experience using motor imagery compared to non-dancers.  
Past research has corroborated the idea that when observing actions, we internally 
simulate the observed movement using similar brain regions used when executing such 
movements. This has been described as the mirror neuron system (Grezes & Decety, 2001). 
Previous fMRI studies using a sample of contemporary dancers (Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 
2006) showed increased activity in areas considered to be a part of the mirror neuron system 
when the dancers viewed movements they had performed before compared with movements they 
have not performed. This opens the question to consider whether these findings would be similar 
when viewing emotional dance stimuli for emotions they have expressed through dance. 
Early research using point-light displays sought to investigate if point-light displays 
could depict dances, and how well emotions could be recognized in these dances (Walk & 
Homan, 1984). Results indicated that participants could identify dance from point-light displays 
and had somewhat accuracy when identifying the type of dance being displayed. In the same 
study, when labels were provided to pick from when identifying the type of dance, accuracy went 
up for recognition of emotion and dance type. In a more recent study, Brownlow, Dixon, Egbert, 
and Radcliffe (1997) examined if dance experience influenced attunements to dance movement. 
This study found that most participants, regardless of experience, could judge happy dances from 
sad. Dance experience allowed for more specific movement judgements of happy verses sad 
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dances, that novices could not pick up on. These findings support ecological theory (McAurther 
& Barron, 1983), because it supports the idea that people are differently attuned to social 
information that is afforded to them by attending to different aspects of the stimuli they perceive. 
The idea that dancers are more attuned to certain aspects of stimuli is supported by other research 
which found that expertise in ballet is associated with higher perceptual sensitivity to subtle 
differences in movement when observing point-light displays (Calvo-Merino, Ehrenberg, Leung, 
Haggard, 2010). Other researchers have found that dance ability is associated with trait 
emotional intelligence (Petrides, Niven, & Mouskounti, 2016). Christensen, Gomila, Gaigg, 
Sivarajah, and Calvo-Merino (2016) found that motor expertise in emotionally expressive body 
movement modulated sensitivity when viewing others affective body movement. Their findings 
suggest the importance of replication to examine if these results will extend to different stimuli, 
such as more artistic or more everyday type expression of emotions. 
Hypothesis 
There have been few studies that assess how expertise in dance can play a role in 
perceiving emotions from kinematics. The present study aims to identify if experience in 
portraying emotions through dance will affect recognition of emotional body movement. This 
research will assess this by comparing recognition between novice viewers and those with dance 
experience.  By using videos of point-light displays of movement, all extraneous factors that may 
affect recognition of emotions (such as music, background information, or facial expression) will 
be removed. The videos will display either anger, sadness, happiness, or fear. This experiment 
will use two conditions: experienced dancer viewing the stimuli, and novice viewers viewing the 
stimuli. The research hypothesis predicts that observers with dance experience will have higher 
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accuracy on correct identification of emotions than non-dancers. Additionally, observers with 
dance experience will have faster reaction times (RT) across emotions when making these 
judgements than non-dance observers. 
CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 
Participants 
Forty-four young adults (N = 44) ranging from 18-23 years of age (Mage= 19; Mfemale = 
27, Mmale = 17) were recruited to participate in this study. Twenty-one of the participants had 
dance experience (n = 21) and twenty-three participants (n = 23) had no dance experience. The 
participants in the dance group were recruited through the University of Central Florida’s dance 
minor program’s classes. The participants in the non-dance group were recruited from the 
University of Central Florida’s Psychology department’s participant pool website. Participants 
received extra or partial course credit in exchange for their participation.   
Materials 
The body movement stimulus set was created and used by Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, 
and Young’s (2004) experiment that aimed to see if neurological damage impaired the ability to 
recognize basic emotions from body movement. This stimulus set contained videos of emotion 
portrayals in point-light of four emotions: anger, fear, happiness, and sadness. The actor’s joints 
were displayed using reflective tape so that only their joints (wrists, elbows, shoulders, hips, 
knees, and ankles) are shown against a black background. Ten different actors (five female and 
five male) displayed the emotions for a total of forty video clips. Each video clip was three 
seconds long. 
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The demographic questionnaire was administered through Qualtrics at the end of the 
experimental task. It collected basic demographic information about the participants age, 
biological sex, and ethnicity. In addition to demographic information, it asked about previous 
dance experience and if the participant was completing a dance minor at the University of 
Central Florida. 
To run the experiment, an Alienware AW15R2 15.6-inch laptop running with an Nvidia 
GeForce GTX 970M graphics card running Windows 10 was used. Observers sat with their eyes 
20 inches from the monitor. The experiment used PsychoPy v3.0 for stimulus presentation and 
response recording, including reaction time data. 
Procedure 
The study took place at the University of Central Florida’s Psychology department as 
well as room #T105 of the University of Central Florida’s Theater department. Upon arrival to 
the room, participants were presented a summary of the study and provided informed consent. 
Participants were asked to sit at a desk with minimal distractions where the computer was set up 
on the desk. They were instructed to respond quickly and try to answer as accurate as possible. 
The videos were presented in randomized order for a total of 40 trials, 10 for each emotion. After 
each video, participants were asked what emotion was displayed by the question appearing on a 
white screen and four choices being presented. They made judgments about what they saw by 
pressing a key on the keyboard as instruction (“1” for fear, “2” for sad, “3” for anger, “4” for 
happy). Their response time and accuracy were recorded. Participants filled out a demographic’s 
questionnaire at the end. 
11 
 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Outliers within the data were checked based on the RT across 1760 trials. Trials with a 
RT greater than 2SD (RT > 6.41s) from the mean were excluded from subsequent analysis. Fifty-
four data points were removed out of 1760. For the dance group, the mean RT = 1.95s across 
emotions. For the non-dance group, the mean RT = 1.87s across emotions. After removing 
outliers, a mean accuracy and mean RT was calculated for each of the four emotions. The 
accuracy and RT means were analyzed using 4 × 2 mixed design ANOVA, where the between-
subjects factor is dancer versus non-dancer and the within-subjects factor of emotion type. 
Analysis of Accuracy Data 
When comparing the mean accuracy time between the dance group and non-dance group, 
the dancers (fear: [M = .90, SD = .13], sad: [M = .85, SD = .14], anger: [M =.83, SD = .21], 
happy: [M = .90, SD = .11]) appeared to make about the same amount of accurate judgements as 
the non-dancer groups (fear: [M = .92, SD = .09], sad: [M = .87, SD = .12], anger: [M =.83, SD 
= .15], happy: [M = .87, SD = .11]). A 4 × 2 ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed no main 
effect of dance and non-dance groups F(1,42) = .000, p = .98, ηp2 = .000. When looking at 
accuracy data across emotions regardless of groups, fear was most accurately recognized (M 
= .91, SD = .11). Happy was the second most accurately judged emotions (M = .88, SD = .11). 
The third and fourth were sad (M = .86, SD = .13) and anger (M = .83, SD = .18). There was a 
significant main effect of the emotion type F(3,126) = 2.93, p = .036, ηp2 = .065. There was no 
interaction found between emotion and group F(3,126) = .40, p = .75, ηp2 = .009. Additional 
analyses were run to examine the possibility of sex-specific effects but yielded no significant 
main effect or interaction of sex related differences.  
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Figure 1. The mean accuracy data for the dance group and non-dance group.  
 
 
Figure 2. The mean accuracy data across groups. 
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Analysis of Reaction Time Data 
The RT data showed that across groups, sad (M = 1.82, SD = 1.3) and fear (M = 1.77, SD 
= 1.04) videos had faster recognition times than happy (M = 1.9, SD = 1.24) and anger (M = 
2.16, SD =1.42). A 4 × 2 ANOVA on revealed no significant main effect of emotion F(3, 126) = 
2.26, p = .085, ηp2 = .051. Comparing each emotion’s mean RT showed that the dancer (fear: [M 
= 1.81, SD = 1.10], sad: [M = 1.92, SD = 1.38], anger: [M =2.15, SD = 1.18], happy: [M = 1.94, 
SD = 1.48]) and non-dancer group (fear: [M = 1.82, SD = 1.49], sad: [M = 1.64, SD = .57], 
anger: [M =2.17, SD = 1.63], happy: [M = 1.89, SD = .99]) had similar mean RT for each 
emotion. A 4 × 2 ANOVA revealed no significant group main effect F(1,42) = .06, p = .80, ηp2 = 
.001. There was no significant interaction between emotion and group F(3,126) = .40, p = .75, 
ηp2 = .009. Additional analysis was run to examine any sex-specific effects for RT but yielded no 
significant differences. 
 
Figure 3. The mean RT for the dance group and non-dance group. 
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Figure 4. The mean RT across groups. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSION 
The goal of this study was to determine if dance expertise played a role in perceiving 
emotions through body movement. It was hypothesized that dancers would have increased 
accuracy when making judgments about what emotion was being displayed in point-light videos. 
In addition, it was hypothesized that dancers would have a faster RT than non-dancers. This was 
hypothesized based on the idea that dancers have more experience embodying emotions through 
their own body movement. It was thought that because of their experience displaying emotions 
with their body, dancers would do better on the experimental task. 
The findings did not support the hypothesis. There was no difference in accuracy or RT 
when comparing the dance and non-dance group. There was a difference in detection accuracy as 
a function of emotion, but no differences as a function of dance experience. Dance experience 
did not interact with emotion type. The two groups had similar accuracy scores and RT for each 
emotion, suggesting that dance experience did not play a role in the participants judgements of 
each emotion.  
The accuracy data yielded a significant main effect of emotion type. Both groups had 
increased accuracy when identifying fear and happiness compared to anger and sadness. 
Additionally, the videos displaying sadness and fear had faster mean RT than happiness and 
anger. The emotion with the highest mean RT and least mean accuracy was anger. This suggests 
that out of all the emotions presented in this experiment, participants had increased difficulty 
judging a video as anger. This could be explained by how the stimulus was created. There is a 
difference between natural body movements that occur when expressing an emotion and asking 
someone to force the emotion through their body movement. It could have been that fear and 
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happiness were more accurately produced to look natural, where anger and sadness were less 
natural. The fear and happiness videos may have had more obvious movements that indicated the 
emotion. The findings are inconsistent with previous studies that have found sex differences on 
accuracy during bodily emotion recognition tasks using point light displays (Alaerts, Nackaerts, 
Meyns, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2011). This suggests that the results are tied to the stimulus 
used, indicating a need for future research to further explore this question.  
Limitations 
There were a few limitations experienced during the completion of this study. The 
intention of this study was to assess if dance expertise could modulate increased perceptual 
sensitivity when perceiving emotions. For this study, dance expertise was defined an 
undergraduate student currently completing a dance minor at the University of Central Florida. 
While the minor requires an intense audition, this does not necessarily mean that the dancers 
were experts in their field. The dancers may have had more experience than a participant who 
had never set foot in a dance class, but the differences may not have been as pronounced as it 
would have been with a professional dancer. Additionally, the stimuli that was utilized only 
displayed emotions presented through everyday movement. It is possible that the task was too 
easy, resulting in both groups having similar mean accuracy and RT. 
Future Research 
Future research should address the limitations previously stated. How expertise is defined 
should be addressed and improved upon. Future researchers should attempt to have professional 
dancers participate in the study. If a sample of professional dancers is not available, expertise 
could be extended to using professional actors, as both groups have increased experience in 
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displaying emotions through body movement. Additionally, using stimuli that displayed both 
everyday of emotion as well as dancers displaying the emotion could improve the experimental 
task. 
It is also important to consider perceptual learning in social event perception. Previous 
research has found that giving feedback when making judgments about events enhanced the 
participants calibration to the task, allowing the participant to attune to specific features of the 
event (Bingham, McConnell & Muchisky, 2001; McConnell, Muchisky, & Bingham, 1997). 
Future research should assess differences in the use of feedback for experts compared to novice 
viewers. Previous research has found differences in how experts and novice viewers use 
information when making judgments about badminton plays (Abernethy & Zawi, 2007). It is 
possible that experts may be more receptive to task-specific feedback.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine if expertise played a role in social event 
perception. This study sought to examine if dancers, who have increased experience in 
portraying emotions through dance, had increased perceptual sensitivity to perceiving emotions 
than non-dancers. It was hypothesized that dancers would have increased accuracy and RT 
compared to non-dancers when making judgements about emotional body movement. The results 
rejected this hypothesis, suggesting dance expertise does not play a role in perceiving emotion.
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Figure 1. The mean accuracy data for the dance group and non-dance group.  
 
 
Figure 2. The mean accuracy data across groups. 
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Figure 3. The mean RT for the dance group and non-dance group. 
 
 
Figure 4. The mean RT across groups. 
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